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Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: 
The Statutory Framework and the 
Freedom of the Press 
 
Stephen I. Vladeck∗ 
The debate over the proper balance between national security and free-
dom of the press has traditionally focused on the media’s potential crimi-
nal liability for publishing sensitive information, as was threatened after 
the New York Times and the Washington Post disclosed the U.S. govern-
ment’s secret and warrantless wiretapping of domestic phone calls.1 With 
the issue of press liability for the publication of national security infor-
mation, however, comes a bevy of difªcult questions concerning the scope 
of the protections afforded to the press under the First Amendment.2 
Those questions are made all the more difªcult by the absence of an over-
arching framework statute, akin to England’s Ofªcial Secrets Act,3 that in 
clear and sweeping terms speciªes the means and manner in which the 
press may be held criminally liable for publishing sensitive information. 
Instead, historically the U.S. Congress has focused its attention on more 
discrete targets, punishing the dissemination of very speciªc types of sensi-
tive governmental information, and, in many cases, by very speciªc classes 
of individuals. As such, the statutory framework governing the compli-
cated balance between governmental secrecy and the freedom of the press in 
the United States is little more than a disorganized amalgamation of un-
connected statutes. Some of the provisions overlap each other and border on 
redundancy. Others are difªcult to parse, and cannot possibly prohibit what 
their plain language appears to suggest. Still others, when read together, 
seem to promote mutually inconsistent policy goals. 
In his comprehensive and thought-provoking essay, Professor Stone 
articulates a vision of what the underlying constitutional principles should 
be in striking the proper balance between governmental secrecy and free-
 
                                                                                                                             
∗
 Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. My thanks to Floyd Abrams, 
Scott Armstrong, Sandra Baron, Susan Buckley, Ronald Collins, Robert Corn-Revere, 
Lucy Dalglish, Harold Edgar, Lee Levine, Paul McMasters, Jeffrey Smith, and Geoffrey 
Stone for their participation in a very insightful discussion of these issues at the First 
Amendment Center, and to Becca Steinman for research assistance. 
1
 See Nicholas D. Kristof, Don’t Turn Us into Poodles, N.Y. Times, July 4, 2006, at 
A15. For a background of the disclosures and the legal issues arising from the surveillance 
program, see ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006). 
2
 For a survey that remains relevant today, see Melville B. Nimmer, National Security 
Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 Stan. L. Rev. 
311 (1974). 
3
 Ofªcial Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28 (Eng.); see also Ofªcial Secrets Act, 
1989, c. 6 (Eng.); Ofªcial Secrets Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 75 (Eng.). 
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dom of the press, especially vis-à-vis media disclosures of classiªed na-
tional security information. Thus, Professor Stone proposes, inter alia, “to 
hold that the government cannot constitutionally punish journalists for 
encouraging public employees unlawfully to disclose classiªed informa-
tion, unless the journalist (a) expressly incites the employee unlawfully 
to disclose classiªed information, (b) knows that publication of this in-
formation would likely cause imminent and serious harm to the national 
security, and (c) knows that publication of the information would not mean-
ingfully contribute to public debate.”4 
I do not disagree with Professor Stone that there are compelling (and 
constitutionally based) policy arguments in favor of such a rule. But a 
closer look at the applicable statutory framework reveals a far darker pic-
ture of the reality that would confront a reporter accused of soliciting the 
disclosure of classiªed national security information. That is to say, whereas 
Professor Stone correctly notes that “[t]he laws currently on the books 
are all over the lot,”5 it is at best unclear whether the normative constitu-
tional principles on which Professor Stone relies would truly militate 
against inchoate liability for news gatherers under the Espionage Act.6 
To the contrary, although the statutory framework is not necessarily 
coherent, recent cases, in particular the AIPAC case in the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,7 testify to the importance of under-
standing the different statutory components in their entireties. Indeed, the 
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 Geoffrey R. Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1 Harv. L. & 
Pol’y Rev. 185, 213 (2006). Professor Stone thus embraces a view of the constitutional 
issues that is dependent upon the special role of the press, notwithstanding the extent to 
which “American free speech doctrine has never been comfortable distinguishing among 
institutions.” Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Comment: Principles, 
Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 84, 84 (1998). As I suggest in 
this Essay, Professor Stone’s view necessarily rests on a rather novel view of the Press 
Clause—as extending special protection to aspects of the newsgathering process wholly 
separate from the actual act of publication—which has long been the target of calls for special 
constitutional protections for the press. Compare, e.g., David A. Anderson, The Origins of 
the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 455 (1983) (suggesting that the Press Clause may in 
fact be open to such a reading), and Randall P. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 
63 Va. L. Rev. 731 (1977) (same), with David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 
UCLA L. Rev. 77 (1975) (taking the opposite view). 
5
 Stone, supra note 4, at 207. 
6
 There are two separate questions necessarily subsumed within this larger inquiry. 
First, does the First Amendment protect the publication of sensitive national security in-
formation, such as the disclosure of the Terrorist Surveillance Program (“TSP”) by the 
New York Times and the Washington Post? Second, even if it does, does that protection 
extend to the instrumentalities of journalism—to the reporting and the newsgathering? Or 
is the protection speciªc to the publication—to the speech act itself? It is this second ques-
tion that has been dramatically understudied. For two attempts see Timothy B. Dyk, News-
gathering, Press Access, and the First Amendment, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 927 (1992) and Note, 
The Rights of the Public and the Press To Gather Information, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1505 
(1974). 
7
 See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006). See generally Nat 
Hentoff, Bush Revives Espionage Act, Village Voice, Nov. 10, 2006, http://www.village 
voice.com/news/0646,hentoff,75002,6.html (noting the dangerous implications of the deci-
sion in Rosen).  
2007] Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act 221 
lack of clarity notwithstanding, there are numerous statutes under which 
the press may ªnd itself liable for the gathering and reporting of stories 
implicating governmental secrecy, especially as courts increasingly em-
brace theories of third-party inchoate liability under the Espionage Act, 
as in the AIPAC case. 
Thus, this Essay both surveys the statutory framework applicable in 
cases involving the publication of classiªed national security information 
and suggests that, should the government begin to prosecute members of 
the press for soliciting violations of these statutes on theories of inchoate 
liability, the constitutional principles invoked by Professor Stone may not 
provide as complete a defense as many would hope. That there is a pro-
nounced gap between the theory and the reality in this ªeld is hardly sur-
prising. Understanding the scope of that gap, however, is essential. As I 
suggest below, the application of theories of inchoate liability to the am-
biguous language of the Espionage Act might render members of the me-
dia subject to criminal liability for acts of newsgathering wholly separate 
from acts of publication, and therefore less likely to fall within the um-
brella of the press protections enmeshed within the First Amendment. 
I. The Espionage Act 
To assess the force of Professor Stone’s constitutional arguments, I 
begin with the statutory framework applicable to prosecutions of news 
gatherers for soliciting the disclosure of classiªed national security in-
formation.8 Although Professor Stone’s essay centers on statutes of gen-
eral applicability, the statutes more directly targeted at national security 
leaks and leakers are, owing to their ambiguity and seemingly wide-ranging 
applicability, all the more dangerous. 
From the Sedition Act of 1798,9 which expired in 1801, through the 
outbreak of the First World War, there was virtually no federal legislation 
prohibiting seditious expression. Nor were there laws prohibiting the dis-
semination or publication of information harmful to the national defense.10 
Contemporaneously with the United States’s entry into the war, however, 
Congress enacted the Espionage Act of 1917,11 which, except for the 
amendments discussed below, remains on the books largely in its original 
form today at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793–799. Written largely by then-Assistant At-
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 The deªnitive academic survey of these statutes remains Harold Edgar & Benno C. 
Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes and Publication of Defense Information, 73 Colum. 
L. Rev. 929 (1973); see also Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright 
Comes Home: Executive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev. 349 (1986) (updating their earlier analysis). 
9
 Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801). 
10
 For one of the few counterexamples, see Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 226, 36 Stat. 1084 
(prohibiting the disclosure of certain national defense secrets) (repealed 1917). 
11
 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codiªed as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 793 
et seq.). 
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torney General Charles Warren, the Act included a number of seemingly 
overlapping and often ambiguous provisions. 
A 
Current 18 U.S.C. § 793(a), which derives from section 1(a) of the Es-
pionage Act, prohibits the obtaining of information concerning a series of 
national defense installations—places—“with intent or reason to believe 
that the information is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to 
the advantage of any foreign nation.” Similarly, § 793(b) prohibits indi-
viduals with “like intent or reason to believe” from copying, taking, mak-
ing, or obtaining “any sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, 
plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of 
anything connected with the national defense.” Although an early legal 
challenge argued that the requirement that the information at issue be 
“connected with the national defense” was unconstitutionally vague, the 
Supreme Court read a scienter requirement into the statute (and thus up-
held it) in Gorin v. United States in 1941.12 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gorin also held that the Act likely 
could not prohibit the collection of public information.13 Hence, § 793(a) 
and 793(b) are unlikely candidates for potential press liability under the 
Espionage Act. The mere gathering or publication of the information speci-
ªed in the two provisions would only sustain charges under the Act if the 
reporter at issue had “intent or reason to believe that the information to 
be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the ad-
vantage of any foreign nation.”14 Thus, the scienter requirement read into 
these provisions in Gorin renders potential press liability under § 793(a) 
and 793(b) unlikely. 
B 
Section 793(c) is, in important ways, far broader. The descendant of 
section 1(c) of the Espionage Act, the provision creates criminal liability 
for any individual who “receives or obtains or agrees or attempts to receive 
or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever” various material 
related to the national defense, so long as the individual “know[s] or ha[s] 
reason to believe, at the time he receives or obtains [the information] . . . 
that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made, or disposed of by any 
 
                                                                                                                             
12
 312 U.S. 19, 27–28 (1941) (“The obvious delimiting words in the statute are those 
requiring ‘intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the 
injury of the United States, or to the advantage of any foreign nation.’”); see also United 
States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 918 (4th Cir. 1980) (discussing Gorin’s scienter 
requirement); In re Squillacote, 790 A.2d 514, 519 (D.C. 2002) (per curiam) (same). 
13
 See 312 U.S. at 27–28; see also United States v. Heine, 151 F.2d 813 (2d Cir. 1945). 
14
 18 U.S.C. § 793(a)–(b). 
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person contrary to the provisions of [the Espionage Act].” Thus, whereas 
§ 793(a) and 793(b) prohibit the collection of secret information relating 
to the national defense, § 793(c) prohibits the receipt of such information, or 
even attempts at receipt thereof, so long as the recipient does or should 
have knowledge that the source, in obtaining the information, violated some 
other provision of the Espionage Act. 
In addition, whereas § 793(d) and 793(f) prohibit the dissemination 
of national security information that is in the lawful possession of the 
individual who disseminates it (§ 793(d) prohibits willful communica-
tion; § 793(f) prohibits negligence), § 793(e)—which, like § 793(d) and 
793(f), derives from section 1(d) of the Espionage Act15—prohibits the same 
by an individual who has unauthorized possession of the information at 
issue. 
Thus, in sweeping language, § 793(e) prohibits individuals from will-
fully communicating—or attempting to communicate—to any person not 
entitled to receive it: 
any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photo-
graph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instru-
ment, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or in-
formation relating to the national defense which information the 
possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the 
United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation. 
Section 793(e) goes one important step farther, however, for it also pro-
hibits the retention of such information and the concomitant failure to 
deliver such information “to the ofªcer or employee of the United States 
entitled to receive it.” 
Section 793(e) therefore appears to have a far more relaxed intent 
requirement than § 793(a) and 793(b). The provision does not require spe-
ciªc intent so long as the communication or retention of classiªed infor-
mation is willful. From the perspective of the press, then, § 793(e) is eas-
ily one of the most signiªcant provisions in the debate over governmental 
secrecy versus freedom of the press. As a result, it has received the most 
attention in judicial and scholarly discussions of the Act and its potential 
constitutional inªrmities, most famously in the various opinions in the 
Pentagon Papers case.16 Largely because it lacks a speciªc intent require-
ment, it was recently described as “pretty much one of the scariest stat-
utes around.”17 
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 The three provisions were modiªed and separated by the Subversive Activities Con-
trol Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-831, tit. I, § 18, 64 Stat. 987, 1003. 
16
 See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
17
 Susan Buckley, Reporting on the War on Terror: The Espionage Act and 
Other Scary Statutes 9 (2d ed. 2006). 
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The Eastern District of Virginia’s recent decision in the AIPAC case 
may bolster such concerns over the scope of § 793(e). In the case, United 
States v. Rosen,18 the district court sustained, for perhaps the ªrst time, the 
liability of third parties (albeit, not the press) for conspiring to violate 
§ 793(d) and 793(e). Speciªcally, Steven Rosen and Keith Weissman, lobby-
ists for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), were al-
leged to have received classiªed information about the Middle East, Iran, 
and terrorism from Lawrence A. Franklin, an analyst for the Department 
of Defense, before passing that information on to a journalist and an Is-
raeli diplomat. With respect to Rosen, the court sustained the indictment 
for aiding and abetting a violation of § 793(d). As Judge Ellis noted: 
Although the question whether the government’s interest in pre-
serving its national defense secrets is sufªcient to trump the 
First Amendment rights of those not in a position of trust with 
the government is a more difªcult question, and although the au-
thority addressing this issue is sparse, both common sense and 
the relevant precedent point persuasively to the conclusion that 
the government can punish those outside of the government for 
the unauthorized receipt and deliberate retransmission of infor-
mation relating to the national defense.19 
Thus, “[t]he conclusion here is that the balance struck by § 793 be-
tween these competing interests is constitutionally permissible because 
(1) it limits the breadth of the term ‘related to the national defense’ to mat-
ters closely held by the government for the legitimate reason that their 
disclosure could threaten our collective security; and (2) it imposes rig-
orous scienter requirements.”20 By sustaining for the ªrst time the liabil-
ity of third-party intermediaries under the Espionage Act (and by afªrming, 
in Rosen’s case, the indictment for aiding and abetting a violation of the 
statute), the district court in Rosen thus acknowledged, however implicitly, 
the broadest source of potential press liability under the Espionage Act—
third-party inchoate liability arising out of newsgathering. 
C 
A number of judges and scholars have argued against the applicabil-
ity of § 793(e) to the press because of the absence of an express reference 
to the “publication” of such secret national security information. In con-
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 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
19
 Id. at 637. 
20
 Id. at 645 (footnote omitted). 
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trast, three separate provisions of the Espionage Act do expressly prohibit 
the publication of particular national defense information.21 
First, § 794(b) applies to “[w]hoever, in time of war, with intent that 
the same shall be communicated to the enemy, collects, records, publishes, 
or communicates . . . [the disposition of armed forces] or any other informa-
tion relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy.” 
Although the provision might appear to turn on whether it is a “time of war,” 
§ 798A expands § 794(b) to apply so long as various national emergencies 
remain in place, a condition that remains satisªed today. In addition, a court 
might infer the requisite intent from the act of publication itself. 
Second, § 797 applies to whoever “reproduces, publishes, sells, or 
gives away” photographs of speciªed defense installations, unless the pho-
tographs were properly censored. 
Third, § 798(a), which generally relates to cryptography and was 
passed in 1950 at least largely in response to the Chicago Tribune inci-
dent from World War II,22 applies to whoever “communicates, furnishes, 
transmits, or otherwise makes available . . . or publishes” various prohib-
ited materials, including “classiªed information . . . concerning the commu-
nication intelligence activities of the United States or any foreign gov-
ernment.” Section 798(b) deªnes “classiªed information” as “information 
which, at the time of a violation of this section, is, for reasons of national 
security, speciªcally designated by a United States Government Agency for 
limited or restricted dissemination or distribution.” 
Those who argue against the applicability of other provisions of the 
Act to the press, in addition to the three codiªed provisions of the Espio-
nage Act that expressly prohibit the act of publication, often invoke lan-
guage in one of the early drafts of the Espionage Act that was rejected by 
Congress. It would have provided that: 
During any national emergency resulting from a war to which 
the United States is a party, or from threat of such a war, the Presi-
dent may, by proclamation, declare the existence of such emer-
gency and, by proclamation, prohibit the publishing or commu-
nicating of, or the attempting to publish or communicate any in-
formation relating to the national defense which, in his judg-
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 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 720–21 (Douglas, J., concurring). But see id. at 
737–40 & nn.8–10 (White, J., concurring) (arguing that the New York Times and the Wash-
ington Post could constitutionally have been prosecuted for violating § 793(e)) 
22
 The Chicago Tribune published a story shortly after the Battle of Midway suggest-
ing that the United States had prior warning of the Japanese attack. Concerned that Japa-
nese intelligence would correctly surmise that the Americans had broken Japanese codes, 
the United States prosecuted the Tribune. Fearful that the charges themselves would tip off 
the Japanese, the United States dropped the case. See Jeffery A. Smith, Prior Restraint: 
Original Intentions and Modern Interpretations, 28 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 439, 467 
(1987). 
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ment, is of such character that it is or might be useful to the en-
emy.23 
As Justice Douglas noted in his concurrence in the Pentagon Papers case, 
the provision was principally rejected by the Senate on First Amendment 
grounds. As a result, those enacted provisions that do not expressly refer 
to “publishing” or to the act of publication should not be applied to the 
press.24 But what Justice Douglas did not consider is perhaps the central 
question going forward: Are there ways in which reporters, by virtue of 
being reporters, are shielded from all liability under the Espionage Act, 
even for violations unrelated to publication? Put differently, does the 
First Amendment’s Press Clause possibly provide a defense in such cases 
not generally available to the public? I will return to this question shortly. 
D 
One other noteworthy provision of the Espionage Act is 18 U.S.C. 
§ 794(a), which applies to “[w]hoever, with intent or reason to believe 
that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage 
of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits . . . to any for-
eign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within 
a foreign country, . . . any document, . . . [other physical items], or in-
formation relating to the national defense.” Thus, there is at least a plau-
sible argument that the publication of certain national security informa-
tion would constitute the communication of such information to a foreign 
government, and the issue, once again, would turn solely on whether the 
publisher had “intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the in-
jury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation.” Owing 
to the similarities in statutory language, would the scienter requirement 
from Gorin apply to a prosecution under this section? 
Overlapping § 794(a) is 50 U.S.C. § 783, enacted as part of the 1950 
amendments to the Espionage Act.25 Section 783 also prohibits the com-
munication of classiªed information by an “ofªcer or employee of the 
United States” to agents or representatives of foreign governments. As 
with § 794(a), there is at least a colorable argument that the act of publi-
cation, because it would have the likely effect of communicating the in-
formation to agents or representatives of foreign governments, might it-
self violate the text of the statute, if not the spirit. 
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 55 Cong. Rec. 1763 (1917). 
24
 N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 721–22 (citing 55 Cong. Rec. 2167 (1917)). 
25
 See supra note 15. 
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E 
Finally, it is critical to note that the Espionage Act also contains two 
independent conspiracy provisions. Pursuant to § 793(g), “[i]f two or more 
persons conspire to violate any of the foregoing provisions of this sec-
tion, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of 
the conspiracy, each of the parties to such conspiracy shall be subject to 
the punishment provided for the offense which is the object of such con-
spiracy.” Section 794(c) is to similar effect. 
It is in the context of the conspiracy provisions that the potential li-
ability of the press for the publication of governmental secrets becomes a 
much more troubling issue. Leaving aside the individual liability of the 
press for the act of publication, § 793(e) prohibits the unauthorized re-
ceipt of certain national security secrets, and other provisions of the Act 
prohibit, in broader strokes, the obtaining of such information. 
Moreover, one of the central issues that may surface in a future prose-
cution of the press under the Espionage Act is inchoate liability—whether 
the reporters are liable either as co-conspirators, or for aiding and abet-
ting the individuals who provided the protected information.26 Because 
such liability would attach to the possession of information, and not to its 
publication, the potential protections of the First Amendment’s Press 
Clause are, at a minimum, not as clearly established27 and may not pro-
vide much of a defense at all.28 To the contrary, “[w]hile the Supreme Court 
in Branzburg v. Hayes recognized that ‘without some protection for seek-
ing out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,’ the Court 
has yet to explicitly afford special protections to the newsgathering proc-
ess.”29 Thus, even though the First Amendment might provide protection 
from restraints on publication, including, perhaps, after-the-fact criminal 
prosecution, there is simply no precedent for the proposition that the 
First Amendment provides any defense to illicit acts of gathering the 
news, especially when the story never makes it into print. 
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 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (aiding and abetting); id. § 371 (conspiracy). 
27
 See First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 799–800 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concur-
ring) (“The Speech Clause standing alone may be viewed as a protection of the liberty to 
express ideas and beliefs, while the Press Clause focuses speciªcally on the liberty to dis-
seminate expression broadly and ‘comprehends every sort of publication which affords a 
vehicle of information and opinion.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Lovell v. Grifªin, 303 U.S. 
444, 452 (1938)).  
28
 The Press Clause arguably is implicated only when the enforcement of governmental 
secrecy impacts the press itself. See Louis Henkin, The Right To Know and the Duty To 
Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 271, 277 (1971). 
29
 Dyk, supra note 6, at 928 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)). 
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II. Other Important Statutes 
The Espionage Act, while important, is merely one subset of a much 
larger range of statutes implicating the balance between governmental 
secrecy and freedom of the press. When considered in conjunction with 
the inchoate liability issue noted above, the other statutes should provide 
just as much cause for concern as the more open-ended provisions of the 
Espionage Act. 
A 
First, and perhaps most important, is 18 U.S.C. § 641, one of the 
statutes at issue (along with § 793(d) and 793(e)) in the famous case of 
United States v. Morison.30 Originally enacted in 1875,31 § 641 applies to: 
Whoever . . . knowingly converts to his use or the use of an-
other, or without authority, sells, conveys or disposes of any re-
cord, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United States or 
of any department or agency thereof . . . ; or 
 
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to 
convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, 
stolen, purloined or converted . . . . 
Thus, § 641, in general terms, prohibits the conversion of any “thing 
of value” to the U.S. government, and also prohibits the knowing receipt 
of the same, “with intent to convert it to his use or gain.” 
Relying on § 641, the government prosecuted Samuel Morison for 
transmitting photographs of a new Soviet aircraft carrier to Jane’s Defence 
Weekly, an English publisher of defense information. As the court noted: 
The defendant would deny the application of [§ 641] to his theft 
because he says that he did not steal the material “for private, 
covert use in illegal enterprises” but in order to give it to the 
press for public dissemination and information . . . . The mere 
fact that one has stolen a document in order that he may deliver 
it to the press, whether for money or for other personal gain, 
will not immunize him from responsibility for his criminal act.32 
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 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988). 
31
 See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 144, 18 Stat. 479 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 641 
(West 2000 & Supp. 2006)).  
32
 See Morison, 844 F.2d at 1077.  
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In one exceptional case, a district court even held that using a gov-
ernment photocopier to make copies of government-owned documents could 
trigger liability under § 641.33 
Considered in conjunction with the discussion of inchoate liability 
above, the potential liability under § 641 for reporters may be just as 
broad, if not broader, than the liability under § 793(d) and 793(e). As 
Judge Winter worried in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung: 
[B]ecause the statute was not drawn with the unauthorized dis-
closure of government information in mind, § 641 is not care-
fully crafted to specify exactly when disclosure of government 
information is illegal . . . . This ambiguity is particularly dis-
turbing because government information forms the basis of 
much of the discussion of public issues and, as a result, the un-
clear language of the statute threatens to impinge upon rights 
protected by the ªrst amendment. Under § 641 as it is written, 
. . . upper level government employees might use their discre-
tion in an arbitrary fashion to prevent the disclosure of govern-
ment information; and government employees, newspapers, and 
others could not be conªdent in many circumstances that the 
disclosure of a particular piece of government information was 
“authorized” within the meaning of § 641.34 
Thus, the broad discretion afforded to government ofªcials could have a 
pronounced chilling effect on newsgathering concerning information that 
might fall within the scope of § 641. Especially because the reporter may 
not know whether disclosure of the information at issue is or is not “au-
thorized,” the potential inchoate liability for conversion is massive in its 
breadth. 
B 
Also relevant to any discussion of freedom of the press and govern-
mental secrecy are 18 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 1924. Enacted in 1933,35 § 952 
relates speciªcally to diplomatic codes and correspondence, and applies 
to government employees who, without authorization, publish or provide 
to a third-party diplomatic codes, or diplomatic correspondence “ob-
tained while in the process of transmission between any foreign govern-
ment and its diplomatic mission in the United States.” 
A fair reading of the statute is that it prohibits the publication by the 
government employee, and not by an independent third-party, but incho-
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ate liability could still lead to liability for press reporting on encrypted 
communications between the United States and foreign governments or its 
overseas missions. 
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 1924, enacted in 1994,36 prohibits the unauthor-
ized removal and retention of classiªed documents or material. It applies 
to: 
Whoever, being an ofªcer, employee, contractor, or consultant of 
the United States, and, by virtue of his ofªce, employment, po-
sition, or contract, becomes possessed of documents or materi-
als containing classiªed information of the United States, [who] 
knowingly removes such documents or materials without au-
thority and with the intent to retain such documents or materials 
at an unauthorized location. 
Both of these statutes, although they may not apply directly to reporters, 
would also be susceptible to theories of inchoate liability; a colorable argu-
ment could be made that a reporter using a government employee as a 
source would be liable if that source, in the process of disclosing infor-
mation to the reporter, violated either § 952 or § 1924. 
C 
Three additional statutes, which regulate speciªc types of secret in-
formation, are also relevant to the analysis. First among these is the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011 to 2296b-7. Sections 
2274, 2275, and 2277 thereof prohibit the communication, receipt, and 
disclosure, respectively, of “Restricted Data,” which is deªned as “all data 
concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; 
(2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special 
nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data 
declassiªed or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to 
section 2162 of this title.”37 In the Progressive case, in which the U.S. gov-
ernment successfully enjoined the publication of an article titled The H-
Bomb Secret: How We Got It, Why We’re Telling It, it was the potential 
violation of § 2274(b) that formed the basis for the injunction.38 
A very different statute, and one arguably of more relevance today—
at least vis-à-vis the Valerie Plame affair39—is the Intelligence Identities 
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Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. §§ 421–426. As is now well known, 
conservative columnist Bob Novak disclosed the identity of CIA opera-
tive Valerie Plame in a July 14, 2003, newspaper column.40 Novak re-
ported that two senior administration ofªcials, potentially in violation of 
the 1982 statute, had revealed Plame’s identity.41 Speciªcally, § 421 pro-
hibits the disclosure of information relating to the identity of covert agents. 
Whereas § 421(a) and 421(b) prohibit the disclosure of such information 
by individuals authorized to have access to classiªed information identi-
fying the agent, § 421(c) applies to anyone who “discloses any informa-
tion that identiªes an individual as a covert agent to any individual not 
authorized to receive classiªed information, knowing that the information 
disclosed so identiªes such individual and that the United States is taking 
afªrmative measures to conceal such individual’s classiªed intelligence 
relationship to the United States.” The individual must “intend[ ] to iden-
tify and expose covert agents and [have] reason to believe that such ac-
tivities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the 
United States.” Importantly, though, § 421(c) “does not predicate liability on 
either access to or publication of classiªed information.”42 
Finally, the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951, 35 U.S.C. §§ 181–188, 
protects the disclosure of information relating to patents under “secrecy” 
orders. The statutory punishment, however, for disclosure of information 
relating to a patent under a secrecy order is forfeiture of the patent.43 No 
criminal liability appears to attach to such disclosures. 
III. Inchoate Liability and the Constitutional Problem 
As the above survey of the relevant statutes suggests, reporters in-
volved in the disclosure of classiªed national security information could 
face criminal liability under any number of different statutes. And, as the 
recent AIPAC case suggests, the inchoate liability problem in not an ab-
stract one. 
The problem is simple to describe: There is a substantial argument 
that a reporter may be prosecuted under the Espionage Act for receiving 
certain national security information if he has reason to believe that such 
information is classiªed. There is also a colorable argument that a re-
porter may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 641—the statute principally 
at issue in the Morison case—or under 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) or (e), for so-
liciting the unlawful removal of classiªed governmental information. 
Unless the reporter can demonstrate that he did not know or have reason 
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to believe that the information was actually classiªed, and, in the latter 
case, unless the reporter could show that he only learned of the informa-
tion anonymously and after-the-fact, the statutes appear to apply. 
In broader strokes, the problem arises from the open-ended wording 
of the statutes surveyed in Parts I and II. Leaving aside the potential li-
ability of newspapers for publishing classiªed national security informa-
tion, there are many other moments earlier in the reporting process dur-
ing which reporters might face liability. And inasmuch as the reporters 
may not be directly liable for removing or disclosing the classiªed national 
security information at issue, theories of inchoate liability would open the 
door to criminal liability where the the reporter played any role in en-
couraging or otherwise facilitating the disclosure. The unfortunate ambigu-
ity of the relevant statutes creates the real problem in these cases; it is at 
least plausible to ªnd a violation of these provisions by even the most well-
intentioned (and passive) reporters. 
Two questions necessarily arise: First, does the First Amendment 
protect reporters from such broad theories of liability under the statutes 
surveyed in Parts I and II? Second, should it? I address these questions in 
turn. 
A 
In determining the extent of reporters’ protection from liability un-
der the statutes discussed above, there is much that is instructive in the 
Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper.44 In Bartnicki, which 
dealt with the federal wiretap statutes, the Court held that the First Amend-
ment protected a radio station that replayed an illegally intercepted tele-
phone call. The Court relied on three critical facts. First, the Court em-
phasized that the members of the media had played no role in the illegal 
interception of the conversation, and had, instead, learned of the intercep-
tion only after it took place. Second, the radio station itself lawfully ob-
tained the recording, even though the recording itself was obtained unlaw-
fully. Third, the content of the recording was a matter of public concern. 
The majority was nevertheless at pains to point out that its holding did 
not extend to situations where the relevant information was obtained 
unlawfully by the media. Quoting Branzburg, the Court emphasized: 
[I]t would be frivolous to assert—and no one does in these 
cases—that the First Amendment, in the interest of securing news 
or otherwise, confers a license on either the reporter or his news 
sources to violate valid criminal laws. Although stealing docu-
ments or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy infor-
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mation, neither reporter nor source is immune from conviction 
for such conduct, whatever the impact on the ºow of news.45 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer (joined by Justice O’Connor) 
seized on the signiªcance of these distinctions by emphasizing the narrow-
ness of the First Amendment right recognized in Bartnicki. Justice Breyer 
eschewed the notion that Bartnicki created a public interest exception to 
criminal liability for publishing illegally obtained information, focusing 
on the unique facts of the case. “Given these circumstances,” he wrote, 
“along with the lawful nature of respondents’ behavior, the statutes’ en-
forcement would disproportionately harm media freedom.”46 
In that regard, Bartnicki was largely a reafªrmation of the so-called 
“Daily Mail principle” that “if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful in-
formation about a matter of public signiªcance then state ofªcials may 
not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need 
. . . of the highest order.”47 As Justice Marshall explained in 1989: 
To the extent sensitive information rests in private hands, the 
government may under some circumstances forbid its noncon-
sensual acquisition, thereby bringing outside of the Daily Mail 
principle the publication of any information so acquired. To the 
extent sensitive information is in the government’s custody, it 
has even greater power to forestall or mitigate the injury caused 
by its release. The government may classify certain information, 
establish and enforce procedures ensuring its redacted release, and 
extend a damages remedy against the government or its ofªcials 
where the government’s mishandling of sensitive information 
leads to its dissemination. Where information is entrusted to the 
government, a less drastic means than punishing truthful publi-
cation almost always exists for guarding against the dissemina-
tion of private facts.48 
Fairly read, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, cul-
minating with Bartnicki, suggests that the First Amendment would only pro-
tect the dissemination of illegally intercepted information in cases with 
analogous facts, where the media had clean hands, and where the coun-
tervailing privacy interest was comparatively minor. Such cases are, to be 
sure, difªcult to ªnd. 
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The contrasting issues that would arise in a prosecution under the 
Espionage Act are obvious and straightforward. For whereas the third prong, 
as Professor Stone suggests, could easily be satisªed in cases in which 
details of unlawful government programs are reported on, the ªrst two 
prongs are far more troubling in this context. 
Indeed, even if reporters played no role in the dissemination of clas-
siªed national security information, and even if the subject matter of the 
information were a matter of public concern, the Espionage Act itself makes 
the reporters’ access to the secret information a crime. And under Bart-
nicki, that reality might well be of constitutional signiªcance. For whereas 
Bartnicki upheld a First Amendment privilege on the part of third-party 
media organizations to publish illegally obtained information, it does so 
only where it is not also a crime for the media to possess the information, 
and where the media had no role in obtaining the information in the ªrst 
place. 
And even Bartnicki was 6-3. 
Thus, the First Amendment probably does not protect journalists and 
other news gatherers from violating the Espionage Act through the act of 
newsgathering itself. So long as the retention of classiªed national secu-
rity information is itself unlawful, and so long as the reporters are being 
punished not for the act of publication itself, but for the unlawful gather-
ing of secret information, it is impossible to ªnd any precedent in the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that would recognize a First Amendment 
defense. 
B 
That is not to say, however, that such a defense should not exist. Schol-
ars and courts have long debated whether any meaningful distinction ex-
ists between the communications protected by the First Amendment’s 
“Speech” Clause, and that protected by the “Press” Clause.49 As one re-
cent student note put it, “[w]hile the Supreme Court has never directly 
addressed this theoretical question, the Court’s press-related jurispru-
dence strongly reºects the view that the clauses are coextensive in their 
scope and should be read together as a general expressive right.”50 If one 
accepts this interpretation, then inchoate liability under the Espionage 
Act raises no unique constitutional problems. 
The special problem of inchoate liability under the Espionage Act, 
however, may suggest a new medium through which to view the Press 
Clause as protecting different conduct and information than that governed 
by the Speech Clause. That is, whereas cases like Bartnicki might sug-
 
                                                                                                                             
49
 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4. 
50
 Recent Case, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1923, 1923 (2006). See generally David A. Ander-
son, Freedom of the Press, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 429, 430 & nn.2–3 (2002). 
2007] Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act 235 
gest (correctly, I think) that there is no general First Amendment right to 
disseminate secret information publicly, especially secret national secu-
rity information, perhaps the Press Clause could be seen as conferring at 
least some minimal privilege on reporters who are, in good faith, attempt-
ing to uncover illicit governmental activity. 
Thus, we might reconceive of the Press Clause as a stopgap to prevent 
governmental overreaching. Whereas reporters could (and should) still be 
liable for directly violating the Espionage Act, the freedom of the press 
might be seen as extending to immunize at least some of the instrumen-
talities of newsgathering. The government would still have a remedy against 
the leaker, and the reporters would still be liable for any conduct that is 
expressly and directly prohibited by the Espionage Act (e.g., retaining ille-
gally disseminated national security information that the reporter knows 
to be classiªed). But reporters would, pointedly, not be liable merely for 
attempting to uncover a story—for contacting sources, for digging into the 
details of secret governmental programs, or encouraging those in posses-
sion of secret information to come forward when disclosure is in the pub-
lic interest. 
To be sure, such a view of the Press Clause would be novel and un-
precedented. Those who have argued for increased protections for the press 
have focused on the signiªcance and centrality of the public discourse 
fomented by publication even of secret (or libelous) information.51 Few 
have suggested that the Press Clause might be given particular content with 
respect to acts of newsgathering, focusing on the chilling effect that the 
absence of such protections might ultimately have on free speech qua publi-
cation.52 
Moreover, a separate point, but one that is at least as important, is 
that which Chief Justice Burger emphasized a quarter-century ago: “Peo-
ple in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, 
but it is difªcult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observ-
ing.”53 
But if freedom of the press is to be given meaningful substantive con-
tent, it must include the freedom to gather the news and not just to report 
it. Under the current statutory regime, even skilled and capable reporters 
(and, perhaps, even the most fearless and reckless of reporters) would be 
deterred from seriously investigating stories that might implicate the Es-
pionage Act. 
For those (like me) who agree with Professor Stone’s underlying 
conclusions, one of the narrowest means by which the First Amendment 
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might be reconceived to provide some protection to reporters in national 
security cases is through the lens of the heretofore underutilized Press 
Clause. For if the press is to be so broadly liable for any newsgathering 
that might in any way violate the Espionage Act, the chilling effect on 
speech generally, and on the importance of public debate in a free society 
speciªcally, will be manifest. As Judge Keith warned just ªve years ago: 
Democracies die behind closed doors . . . . When government 
begins closing doors, it selectively controls information right-
fully belonging to the people. Selective information is misin-
formation. The Framers of the First Amendment “did not trust 
any government to separate the true from the false for us.” They 
protected the people against secret government.54 
IV. Conclusion 
Analysis of the statutory framework appertaining to the balance be-
tween governmental secrecy and freedom of the press, on closer scrutiny, 
yields far more questions than answers. Owing to the dearth of signiªcant 
case law interpreting the more ambiguous—and potentially controversial—
provisions of the Espionage Act, and owing to the absence of a coherent, 
overarching statute governing the publication of national security infor-
mation generally, the statutory framework provides an unsatisfactory lens 
through which to understand the background legal issues. 
Insofar as principal liability is concerned, the central statutes likely 
to be at issue are 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 and 793(e), particularly in light of the 
interpretation of § 793(e) adopted in the AIPAC case in August 2006. But 
as suggested above, the inchoate liability issues are perhaps more sub-
stantial going forward, especially to the extent that inchoate liability would 
arguably provide a means around the constitutional protections of the Press 
Clause. 
Recognizing a limited Press Clause defense to prosecutions for in-
choate liability under the Espionage Act is hardly a solution to the under-
lying tension deftly expounded by Professor Stone in his essay. Because 
of the extent to which the Espionage Act and the other statutes discussed 
herein render the possession and retention of classiªed national security 
information unlawful, inchoate liability raises a far more serious question 
in the context of these “communicative” crimes than it does in the con-
text of other offenses, as in cases like Bartnicki. Thus, my central pur-
pose in this Essay has been to suggest that the real problem insofar as the 
press is concerned is this facet of these statutes: that, because of their 
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open-ended language, they are easily susceptible to broad theories of in-
choate liability.55 And as Bartnicki suggests, the First Amendment, as cur-
rently construed, does not protect reporters from such prosecution. 
Professor Stone’s essay raises critically important points about the 
balance between governmental secrecy and freedom of the press, and under-
lines the fundamental constitutional principles that should guide our un-
derstanding (and potential resolution of) these troubling issues. The prob-
lem, however, is that the language of the statutes in their current form 
might allow the government to target the media in ways that would not 
implicate these deep constitutional tensions. That does not make the con-
stitutional debate that both Professor Stone and I hope to catalyze any 
less worthwhile, just less likely to actually happen. 
No one seriously contests the central and immutable importance of 
the press in our free society, nor the manifest necessity of protecting the 
press from undue governmental restriction. At the same time, I am hardly 
a First Amendment absolutist. There is some information, such as details 
on how to construct nuclear weapons, to which I recognize absolutely no 
public right, and with respect to the publication of which I would not argue 
for any First Amendment protection.56 But especially where the gathering 
of information cannot itself pose any true threat to the nation—where 
only publication itself might actually harm the national security—the fun-
damental public values inherent in journalism outweigh the countervail-
ing governmental interests. Put differently, the government’s remedies 
vis-à-vis publication of national security information are, in my view, sufª-
cient. The First Amendment should otherwise immunize reporters conduct-
ing good-faith investigations for stories of public concern, even if they 
might technically be held liable under a broad inchoate theory of liability 
under the Espionage Act. After all, as Chief Justice Warren wrote in 1967, 
“[i]t would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we would 
sanction the subversion of one of those liberties . . . which makes the de-
fense of the Nation worthwhile.”57 
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